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Introduction 
In a letter to Jane William Hogg, Mary Shelley explains “[s]ociety is nothing as an end, 
but as a means it is much—the means of allowing one to know the existence of human beings 
with whom one can sympathize” (Selected Letters 199). The essential necessity of sympathy to 
both self and society not only pervades Shelley’s personal writings, but also remains the 
presiding concern of the novel she published a decade prior, Frankenstein; or, The Modern 
Prometheus (1818). Both in theme and structure, Frankenstein perceptibly draws on theories of 
moral sentiments delineated by Romantic thinkers such as her parents William Godwin and 
Mary Wollstonecraft, and by philosophical sentimentalists such as the Scottish philosophers 
David Hume and Adam Smith. As Nancy Yousef explains, their writings, from which Mary 
Shelley draws profound inspiration, harmoniously “adduce sympathy as the self-evident ground 
of social virtues, and the effective root of ‘fellow feeling,’ ‘benevolence’ and ‘humanity’” (5). 
Though Shelley produces an ideology of sympathy which is consistent with the literary and 
philosophical aims of Romanticism, Frankenstein articulates an ideal of sympathetic community 
that, though coveted and pursued by its characters, is never effectively achieved. Insofar as this 
novel embodies Shelley’s participation in Romantic theories of moral sentiments, Frankenstein 
advocates sympathy’s interpersonal and ethical importance through its depiction of the modes of 
violence, dehumanization, and isolation produced by sympathy’s failure.  
Throughout Frankenstein, sympathetic potential is facilitated by the conveyance of 
narrative, typified in oral and written exchange between characters. As Adam Smith argues in 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), narrative exchange between sufferer and sympathizer 
obligates members of society to “place ourselves in [another’s] situation, [to] conceive ourselves 
enduring all the same torments, [to] enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure 
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the same person” (3). Insofar as identification is the natural consequence of sympathetic 
connection, moral sense philosophers relied on sympathetic response to advocate humanitarian 
regard, broaden the scope of natural rights, and transform public sentiment in order to inspire 
social change. To this point, David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) posits “public 
good is indifferent to us except so far as sympathy interests us in it” (394). Mary Shelley, for her 
part, embeds this belief as Frankenstein’s core principle. The novel’s framing narrations are 
attempts at persuasion rather than bare conveyance of fact; each narrator, believing themselves 
misunderstood, conveys their story because their listener’s potential sympathetic response is the 
reward of effective narrative exchange. Because sympathetic responses enact feelings of 
community, identification, and positive regard, sympathy represents to Shelley’s characters the 
only possible salvation from unremitting ostracism.  
If sympathy in Frankenstein can be said to fail, it is important to acknowledge that 
Shelley embeds a single deterrent within each sympathetic opportunity in her novel. Namely, 
interpersonal sympathy in Frankenstein is thwarted by the power and influence of patriarchal 
ideology. As Mary Jacobus explains, Mary Shelley’s critique of "a male-dominated culture may 
be felt to bring with it alienation, repression, division, a silencing of the 'feminine', a loss of 
women's 'inheritance'” (10). Accordingly, the interplay between Captain Robert Walton, Victor 
Frankenstein, and his Creature reveals the violence simultaneously perpetuated and suffered by 
characters who embody and enact patriarchal order. Frankenstein’s narrators each seek the 
redemption of sympathetic community, but seemingly know no other way to advocate their 
worthiness for these things except through the demonization and scapegoating of other men. 
Frankenstein’s critique of patriarchy as the pivotal deterrent to sympathetic community and 
social progress is further demonstrated by the violence enacted by its male characters towards 
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women and the feminine sphere. Veronica Hollinge notes that Frankenstein’s characters “destroy 
precisely those realms of the domestic most closely associated with conventional femininity” 
(210), but their enactment of patriarchal power manifests itself in a more disturbing and tangible 
way: it is the catalyst of every woman’s death in the novel. In its depiction of patriarchy, 
Frankenstein argues that a social order founded within patriarchal ideology is incongruent with 
sympathetic community, its moral merits, and the very perseverance of life.  
The Romantic literary canon, from which Shelley perceptively drew extensive influence, 
often portrays narrative exchange as the primary mode by which characters experience sympathy 
and subsequently modify their ideologies. Frankenstein affirms sympathetic connection as a 
societal and interpersonal imperative, but nonetheless challenges the ease by which narrative 
exchange facilitates this radical emotional response between characters. Though Captain Walton, 
Frankenstein, and the Creature peer into the interiorities of those unlike themselves through 
narrative exchange, the opportunity to sympathize, identify, and thereby elicit a change in 
perception, behavior, or ideology almost unexceptionally culminates in failure. As 
Frankenstein’s critique of gender disparity makes evident, sympathetic failure is informed, 
bolstered, and weaponized by patriarchal ideology. Shelley’s representation of the gendered 
fissure between the public and domestic sphere, the limited civil liberties of Frankenstein’s 
women characters, and rigid standards of idealized masculinity illustrate the myriad ways in 
which patriarchal institutions orchestrate the disenfranchisement of Frankenstein’s characters.  
Patriarchal ideology also fosters the rejection of narrative between the privileged listener 
and speaking sufferer. When confronted by the anguished accounts of the most socially 
vulnerable, each respective narrator either maintains indifference or is only momentarily swayed 
by a swell of emotion before antipathy regains command of their emotions, thoughts, and 
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actions. Frankenstein’s narrators sympathize neither with women nor men they consider lesser 
than themselves and consequently those same narrators are elided from the sympathetic 
companionship they covet. The antipathy demonstrated in Frankenstein engenders monstrosity, 
typified in a patriarchal cycle of violence which lays claim to the lives, wellness, and endeavors 
of Walton, Frankenstein, the Creature, and all who surround them.  
Insofar as Frankenstein formally embodies Mary Shelley’s own moral sense philosophy, 
the aim of this essay is two-fold: first, to argue that recognition of Frankenstein’s participation in 
the Romantic tradition is necessary to best understand the pivotal role of sympathy in the novel. 
As this study will show, Shelley was cognizant of sympathy’s social and ethical necessity, its 
potential to encourage benevolent behavior and catalyze social progress, but remained equally 
aware of its constraints. Whereas Adam Smith’s model of sympathetic narrative exchange 
necessitated the presence of an impartial spectator who would function as a source of “reason, 
principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of 
our conduct” (133), Frankenstein presents listeners who are unflinchingly prejudiced against 
those who beg for their understanding and consequently unwilling to sympathize. Second, it is to 
this end that I wish to show that Shelley’s proto-feminist concerns necessitates our consideration, 
as I additionally argue that Frankenstein presents sympathetic failure as unambiguously 
symptomatic of patriarchal ideology. Because Walton, Frankenstein, and the Creature refuse to 
recant the ideologies which grant them patriarchal authority, they are each entirely unable to 
navigate the world with compassion, instead reigning violence and hatred upon their perceived 
social inferiors. Shelley’s critique of patriarchy thus posits that though sympathetic 
companionship in Frankenstein is both necessary and coveted, it is categorically unattainable 
within a social order so marred by misogynist structures of power. The novel’s depiction of 
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sexism, gendered violence, and toxic masculinity therefore represents for its readers a world in 
which sympathy fails to facilitate a fuller understanding of difference, to bridge the gap between 
self and Other, and to remedy the anguish of the most isolated members of society.  
 
Scholarly Rationale 
Academic interpretations of Frankenstein have broadly confirmed Mary Shelley’s textual 
investment in moral sense philosophy and feminist critique, but too often in separate or too 
limited considerations, as the novel’s core tragedy rests in its amalgamation of the social and 
moral necessity of sympathy and the patriarchal ideology used to ensure its agonizing failure. As 
we unearth the narrative differences between Frankenstein, Walton, and The Creature’s 
convoluted accounts, it becomes clear, by virtue of their dueling statuses as patriarchal 
authorities, that none of them can be characterized as wholly innocent and unconditionally 
deserving of sympathetic regard. Shelley nevertheless goes to great lengths to incite both her 
characters’ and her reader’s sympathy towards her flawed narrators by recounting the agony of 
their unrelenting isolation and locating their respective monstrosity in their exclusion from 
sympathetic community. This is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in the Creature’s continual 
barring from empathetic society, the calumny he suffers from Frankenstein and Walton, and 
human civilization’s collective impulse to attempt his extermination upon sight. However, that 
the Creature commits indefensible transgressions of his own is beyond argument, so Victor and 
Walton—who are similarly humanized and villainized by the text in dual measure—both 
maintain a degree of justification in vilifying him. For Shelley, sympathetic regard is the vehicle 
by which the innate natural rights and human dignity of others is most readily affirmed and while 
individuals endowed with social privilege within England’s misogynist hierarchy may suffer 
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tangible oppression, they remain simultaneously culpable of wrongdoing so long as they enact 
and uphold patriarchal power. Sympathetic failure, then, is congenitally intertwined with the 
perpetuation of patriarchal ideology. In order to best understand the sympathetic model 
delineated in Frankenstein, the textual function of sympathetic failure and patriarchal power 
cannot be properly understood without acknowledging the comorbidity between the two.  
Mary Shelley tasks the reader as well as Frankenstein’s characters with its central 
problem of sympathetic perception because, true to the Godwinian tradition to which it was 
dedicated, the novel was written with a clear, ethical purpose: it was designed, as William St. 
Clair explains, to “change the perceptions, the knowledge, the understanding, and therefore the 
behavior of those who read or otherwise encountered it” (248). Through its frame narrative, 
Frankenstein reveals the unresolved contradictions between Captain Walton, Frankenstein, and 
his Creature’s perspectives. Privy to Frankenstein’s dueling frame narratives, the reader 
maintains the power to either “abandon” or to “commiserate” (69) with Shelley’s narrators as 
they relay their suffering and subsequent need for sympathetic regard. Such sympathetic 
commiseration for Shelley’s oppressed characters encourages an ethics of compassion which 
exceeds the bounds of the novel and voyages into its interpretation. As each character details 
their respective pursuit of sympathetic connection, their antipathy and violence towards others is 
inadvertently revealed. By structuring the novel as such, the reader, like each of the narrative 
listeners, is encouraged to, however fleetingly, empathize with the harrowing depictions of 
anguish, loss, and suffering that each narrator is burdened with while perpetually being reminded 
of the harm they have inflicted on others. The reader is conscious both to the narrators’ 
supplications of sympathy, their dueling claims of unjust persecution, and the contrary evidence 
which suggests they are not the innocent victims they each claim to be.  
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In this way, Frankenstein resists the unambiguous moral divide between sufferer and 
sympathizer, victim and villain, which so often concentrates the Romantic genre. To this point, 
L. J. Swingle explains that Frankenstein’s ambiguity and structure “encourages the reader to 
leave behind his own world of known truths and falsehoods and to experience the world as the 
novel’s characters experience it” (54). Nonetheless, concerns over Frankenstein’s ethical 
implications persisted amongst critics who have produced disparaging, if not misguided, 
interpretations of the text. Though entirely glorifying or vilifying any of Frankenstein’s narrators 
is precisely what Mary Shelley avoids in her novel, literary criticism has, by and large, sought to 
superimpose a strict moral choice between these characters. A study of early nineteenth-century 
interpretations of Frankenstein reveals that even as Shelley’s contemporaries denigrated the 
novel, their interpretations of its guiding moral indiscriminately sided with Victor Frankenstein. 
Likely informed by the conservative values Shelley contested, these critics interpreted 
Frankenstein’s titular character as the quintessential patriarch. Because Victor Frankenstein is 
father, creator, and sovereign, the Creature is inevitably characterized as a dissenting subject or 
spoiled child. The Creature’s monstrosity and his subsequent barring of the reader’s sympathetic 
perception remains attributed to his rejection of his naturally subservient position within a 
patriarchal hierarchy.  
Recent criticism has broadened its considerations of Frankenstein’s theme and core 
message, but modern interpretations of the novel’s narrators have notably shifted to the opposite 
extreme. Believing the Creature to be Frankenstein’s ultimate victim, J. Paul Hunter describes 
the Creature as “essentially benevolent” (xi). Elizabeth Bear presupposes this sentiment, 
imagining Victor Frankenstein as “an incredible narcissist” (232) and “hypocrite [who] has no 
excuse for his own monstrosity” (234) in sharp comparison to the Creature whom she 
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characterizes as “a benevolent spirit [who] wishes only to help, to be accepted by human society, 
to find companionship” (244). While these interpretations better acknowledge the Creature’s 
complexity as a character, analyses which define the Creature’s crimes as little more than the 
unfortunate consequence of his rejection inadvertently exonerate the character from blame and 
exclude him from Shelley’s core critiques. Neither approach effectively acknowledges the 
nuance of Frankenstein’s core message: while each narrator cites their suffering as the basis by 
which they are deserving of sympathetic regard, neither Captain Walton, Frankenstein, nor his 
Creature function as the novel’s unjust victim. None of Frankenstein’s three narrators are 
entirely deserving of the redemption found within an affirmative sympathetic gaze, but neither 
are they deserving of the gratuitous misfortune visited upon them by other figures in the text. 
Though Frankenstein’s three narrators can at once be hateful and vindictive characters in their 
own right, the reader is nonetheless invited to pity each character in respective turns. As the 
reader navigates the novel's complex scaffolding, the complex fluidity of sympathetic perception 
for more than one narrator is not only possible, but textually encouraged.  
 
I. Contemporary Criticism: 1818 -1824 
Despite Shelley’s aims to illustrate the necessity of sympathy, contemporary reception of 
the novel revealed a societal bias which both resisted Frankenstein’s call to sympathetic 
experience and upheld the very patriarchal infrastructure the novel disparages. Though some 
remained reluctant to find the Creature entirely unworthy of redemption, early interpretations 
sweepingly identified Frankenstein as the novel’s central patriarch, consequently exonerating the 
character of any wrongdoing, and failing to recognize Shelley’s characterization of Frankenstein 
as an antagonist. These considerations subsequently dismissed the Creature as Frankenstein’s 
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disobedient subordinate, his suffering rationalized by his lesser and inhuman nature. Unlike her 
contemporaries, Shelley resisted the notion that those favored within patriarchal hierarchy were 
unerring, exempt from moral criticism, or deserving of unconditional sympathetic regard. 
Shelley instead recognized that patriarchal power afforded the privileged produced unchecked 
dominance over the socially vulnerable and hindered their ability to sympathize with those 
unlike themselves; each of Frankenstein’s narrators are similarly allotted unbridled power over 
individuals who rest at their mercy and Shelley carefully demonstrates that this authority does 
not motivate them to behave like noble sovereigns, but tyrants instead. In failing to disavow the 
philosophy which would absolve characters who signify patriarchal authority of all guilt, 
contemporary criticism failed to recognize both the novel’s gender critiques and its dedication to 
sympathetic failure.   
Percy Shelley was the first to critically engage with Frankenstein, as his essay “On 
Frankenstein” (1817) was written a year before the text’s public circulation. Though it remained 
unpublished until 1832, the essay was formulated to counter anticipated criticism of the novel by 
clearly defining Frankenstein’s “direct moral” (214). Within this analysis, Shelley’s own bias 
towards Victor reveals itself and the issue of the Creature’s monstrosity rises as a predominant 
analytical concern. Percy Shelley posits that “the Being in ‘Frankenstein’ is, no doubt, a 
tremendous creature” (218), but nonetheless identifies the character as “an abortion and an 
anomaly” (214). Somewhat reluctant to completely demonize the character, he grants that the 
Creature is “not the offspring of an unaccountable propensity to evil” (214) but instead rendered 
such through the suffering he endures upon birth. True to the principles exhibited by Godwin, 
Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley, Percy Shelley describes Frankenstein’s philosophy as such: 
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Treat a person ill, and he will become wicked. Requite affection with scorn; —let 
one being be selected, for whatever cause, as the refuse of his kind— divide him, 
a social being, from society, and you impose upon him the irresistible 
obligations— malevolence and selfishness. It is thus that, too often in society, 
those who are best qualified to be its benefactors and its ornaments, are branded 
by some accident with scorn, and changed, by neglect and solitude of heart, into a 
scourge and a curse. (214)  
This interpretation defines the Creature’s monstrosity as the ramification of his expulsion from a 
larger communal order, a societal rejection tantamount to abuse which distorts his “original 
goodness” (214) into “inextinguishable misanthropy” (214). In characterizing the Creature’s 
wrongdoing as “the children. . .of necessity and human nature” (214), Percy Shelley humanizes 
the monster but fails to acknowledge or expand on Victor Frankenstein’s responsibility as his 
maker. Though Shelley expounds on the nature of the Creature’s antagonism in the text, nothing 
is said of Mary Shelley’s careful construction of Victor’s function as an antagonist. His misdeeds 
against the Creature and his failed responsibility towards his family, friends, and larger human 
society, rest completely unaddressed. In proposing that “necessity” and “human nature” (214) 
catalyzed the Creature’s crimes, Percy Shelley elides Frankenstein from any portion of blame 
though he alone is the parent and creator of the character this analysis so diligently attempts to 
humanize.  
John Wilson Croker’s criticism of Frankenstein in The Quarterly Review (1818) similarly 
idolizes Victor and consequently misconstrues the novel’s core disavowal of patriarchy and 
antipathy. Easily the most damning amongst Shelley’s contemporaries, Croker condemned the 
novel’s morbid depiction of reanimation and scientific enterprise, but more pointedly the 
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Creature’s role as the focal character in the text. Insofar as the novel sympathizes with 
Frankenstein’s creature, he argues it “inculcates no lesson of conduct, manners, or morality; it 
cannot mend, and will not even amuse its readers, unless their taste have been deplorably 
vitiated” (218). It is worth acknowledging that the periodical for which Croker was writing, The 
Quarterly Review, was famously conservative; Croker was, by all accounts, a reverent Tory who 
openly rejected the political radicalism of the Romantic movement and took significant issue 
with the “horrible and disgusting absurdity” (218) of the Godwinian tradition to which 
Frankenstein was dedicated. Croker’s demonization of the Creature significantly contrasts his 
characterization of Frankenstein’s role in the novel and belies a fundamental difference in his 
ethical approach to the novel’s ideological aims. His review exclusively refers to Frankenstein’s 
creature as a ‘monster’ and ‘demon’ (216), for example, and while he finds the Creature’s 
eloquence laughable, Croker sarcastically applauds that the Creature’s “education has given him 
so good a taste as to detest himself” (216). In comparison, Victor Frankenstein remains the 
“kind-hearted parent” (217) to an “ungracious child” (217). His subsequent decision to reject and 
destroy his creation is rendered entirely justified. Croker infamously had little tolerance for 
Godwin’s ideology and his firm preservation of late 18th century institutions loads the 
parent/child relationship he ascribes to Frankenstein and the Creature with added meaning. 
Unlike the Romantics and their company, Croker advocated for the preservation of monarchy 
and, by extension, the preservation of male-dominated power structures. Within such a world 
view, the father justly serves as sovereign over his household and if Victor Frankenstein is, as 
Croker would argue, a benevolent father, the attempted destruction of his own creation is neither 
a crime nor transgression, but the rectification of rebellious son.  
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Sir Walter Scott’s review of Frankenstein in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine (March 
1818) offers a balanced mix of praise and criticism for the novel. Despite a measure of praise for 
Mary Shelley as an effective writer, Scott joins other contemporary reviewers in his total 
condemnation of the Creature as a character. He finds fault in Shelley's decision to briefly use 
the Creature as a narrator, for example, explaining that the Creature’s eloquent speech is “not 
only highly improbable, it is injudicious as its unnecessary minuteness tends rather too much to 
familiarize us with this being whom . . . loses, by the lengthy oration, some part of the 
mysterious sublimity annexed to his first appearance” (227). Overall, Scott reads the character as 
little more than an “animated monster” (226) and “material demon” (227) with “malignant and 
blood thirsty” (228) desires. As he retells the Creature’s desire for a companion, Scott speaks 
nothing of the character’s professed loneliness or exclusion from civilization, though these 
motivations are expounded upon at length in the text. Scott instead locates the Creature’s plea for 
a partner as “the means of propagating a hideous race. . .which might render the very existence 
of the present human race a condition precarious and full of horror” (228). In dismissing the 
Creature’s anguish, Scott prescribes malice where, interestingly, even the character of Victor 
Frankenstein, who receives this request in text, does not.  
Akin to Croker, Scott’s analysis absolves Frankenstein from any responsibility for the 
death and destruction that results from the animation of the creature. Victor has, within this 
reading, “[paid] the penalty of his rash researches into the arcana of human nature in a long 
illness” (226) and the subsequent slaughter of Frankenstein’s loved ones by the creature’s hand is 
consequently interpreted as both gratuitous and undeserved. Speaking nothing of Frankenstein’s 
abandonment of the Creature, the cruelty by which he regards him, or the callousness 
Frankenstein repeatedly directs towards his family’s well-being, he is instead characterized as 
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the victim of “a wretch who murdered the lovely and helpless” (229). Excluding any mention of 
The Creature’s good will towards the De Lacey family or his moments of pity towards his 
maker, Scott reduces the Creature’s actions as “acts of horror and depravity” (227), motivated 
exclusively by the “irremediable ruin [of] his creator” (229). Within the confines of this 
interpretation, Frankenstein neither ruins himself nor his family prospects; Scott believes 
Frankenstein to be a prototypically tragic figure unfairly saddled with tribulation. Despite his 
trespassing natural laws of life and creation, Frankenstein is, in Scott’s own words, “an unhappy 
victim. . .exhausted by his sufferings” (229), ultimately free of flaw or misdeed, and Robert 
Walton, who is scarcely mentioned in any contemporary review, is the sole witness to his 
mournful demise.  
Scarcely six years after its publication, critical reception of Frankenstein and its 
characters began to shift in the Creature’s favor, seemingly at the detriment of an honest 
reflection of his primary function as one of the novel’s antagonists. An anonymous review of 
Shelley’s novel in The Knight’s Quarterly (August 1824) argued, as no other critique had done 
before, that the novel’s sympathetic investments rested not in Victor Frankenstein, but his 
progeny. As many critics would later suggest, this writer argued Frankenstein “ought to have 
reflected on the means of giving happiness to the being of his own creation,” instead of abusing 
his creation for “crimes which his [own] negligence gave rise” (240). It is worth noting that this 
contemporary review, which stands alone in its pity towards the monster, rightfully situates 
Frankenstein within a Romantic tradition, applauding the text for “the best instance of natural 
passions applied to supernatural events that [the reader] ever met with” (240). Though the 
reviewer posits that “the most unskillful thing in the book is the extreme ugliness of the being 
whom Frankenstein creates” (240), they nonetheless empathize deeply with Victor’s creature 
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with whom they believe “justice is indisputably on his side” (240). In contrast to the readings 
provided by Croker and Scott, this analysis heavily praises the Creature’s narration; the writer 
confesses their “interest in the book is entirely on the side of the monster. His eloquence and 
persuasion, of which Frankenstein complains, are so because they are truth” (240) and dedicates 
pointed investment in the Creature’s plot above that of Victor Frankenstein and Robert Walton.  
 
II. Modern Criticism: 1970 - Present 
Just as Shelley’s contemporaries allied too readily with Victor Frankenstein, renewed 
interest in the novel broadly demonstrates that modern critical approaches to Frankenstein have 
shifted to the opposite extreme. Present-day approaches to the text now emphasize the Creature’s 
sympathetic worthiness, often at the disservice of the Shelley’s nuanced characterization of the 
character as equal parts sympathetic victim and inexcusable assailant. Critics who discuss 
Frankenstein’s feminist implications generally recognize the novel’s critique of patriarchal 
power. However, uncritical sympathy for the Creature surrenders adequate recognition of his 
function within Shelley’s critique of sympathetic failure, as his animosity and subsequent 
violence towards Frankenstein, Walton, and the novel’s female characters illustrates the 
relationship between patriarchy and antipathy in the text. In A Critical History of Frankenstein, 
Johanna M. Smith explains that scholastic acknowledgement of Mary Shelley prior to the late 
twentieth century was both scarce and significantly biographical in nature. Scholars were 
considerably more interested in Mary Shelley’s status as Percy Shelley’s wife and editor, eliding 
her from his literary circle, and dismissing Frankenstein as “a subset of a more significant 
category such as Romanticism. . .a minor incident in some major and predominantly masculine 
literary tradition” (237). As feminist criticism rose into prominence throughout the 1970’s, 
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scholars interrogated Mary Shelley’s exclusion from the Romantic canon and revaluated 
Frankenstein as a proto-feminist project. Since then, post-1990 criticism has only broadened its 
considerations of previously unexamined elements in the text, effectively extending the 
allegorical applicability of Frankenstein’s archetype of the monster to issues of race, class, 
disability, and sexual identity.  
Recent criticism has gone to great lengths to locate, in strikingly diverse ways, a critique 
of patriarchal institutions at Frankenstein’s core. In their seminal work, The Madwoman in the 
Attic: The Woman Writer and the Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar posit that Frankenstein depicts "woman's helpless alienation in a male society” 
(247) through its depiction of the Creature, whose powerlessness effectively renders him “female 
in disguise" (237). Devon Hodges similarly genders the Creature’s articulation of “the misery of 
being neither fully inside nor outside culture” (200) as an exclusively feminine experience, while 
Ellen Moers’s analysis describes Frankenstein as a semi-autobiographical “horror story of 
maternity” (82). In associating the Creature’s function in the text to the feminine experience, 
these interpretations usually identify Frankenstein and Walton as antagonists who model 
patriarchal authority. These readings rightfully recognize the ways in which both characters 
destroy, trespass against, and eroticize the feminine sphere, but are seldom consistent in their 
articulation of the Creature’s own participation in similar behaviors.  
Though the Creature’s status as Other may indeed be reminiscent to women’s ranking 
within patriarchal hierarchies of power, it cannot be forgotten that the Creature is explicitly 
gendered as male in the text and socialized as such by the characters. Gilbert and Gubar’s 
feminist critique of Frankenstein rightfully unearths an inherent “femaleness...at the heart of this 
apparently masculine book” (232), but by gendering Shelley’s narrators as “Eve and Eve all 
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along” (246), the novel’s investment in patriarchal violence, which is in fact enacted most 
violently by these male characters specifically, is obscured. Shelley’s decision to identify the 
Creature as male cannot be overlooked or understated: his persecution in the text is not rooted in 
the belief that he is not masculine, but in the perception that he performs masculinity incorrectly.  
Both in life and fiction, as Judith Butler explains, failed gender performance “initiates a set of 
punishments both obvious and indirect, and performing it well provides the reassurance that 
there is an essentialism of gender identity after all” (528). It is therefore imperative to recognize 
the manner in which the Creature is rendered unable to conform to the masculine mode most 
elevated within patriarchal ideology: Shelley writes that the Creature “possesse[s] no money, no 
friends, no kind of property” and is “endued with a figure hideously deformed and loathsome” 
(86). Significantly, if Walton’s description of the Creature as a non-European “savage” (14) is to 
be believed, the Creature’s countenance even bars him from the ethnic ideals of colonial 
England. The Creature’s exclusion from communal and sympathetic circles is thus rooted in a 
failure to perform a masculine figure of humanity. 
In examining Shelley’s use of gendered language, Victor’s experiment, which incites the 
totality of Frankenstein’s plot, is revealed to be patriarchal by design. Without the masculine 
privilege of a formal scientific education, Frankenstein would not have had the means of 
effectively executing the mysterious alchemy that animated the Creature from the dead. In 
successfully creating life, Frankenstein effectively usurps the necessity of women in the 
reproductive process and potentially eliminates the only power afforded singularly to 
womankind within patriarchy. It is to this effect that Anne Mellor argues Victor Frankenstein 
functions as a vehicle for patriarchal institutions which “use the technologies of science and the 
laws of the polis to manipulate, control, and repress women” (10). In appropriating the forces of 
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a thunderstorm towards his craft, Frankenstein’s scientific enterprise effectively functions as a 
masculine pursuit against a natural world which Shelley consistently represents as feminine. 
Insofar as his actions serve as an appropriation of the feminine world, Mellor observes that 
Frankenstein’s experiment is the locus in which violence and gender anxiety overlap: “a rape of 
nature, a violent penetration and usurpation of the female’s hiding places of the womb” (10). To 
the detriment of this analysis, Mellor’s condemnation of patriarchal action does not extend 
beyond Frankenstein’s titular character. Scant critical discussion has been made in respect to 
Captain Walton’s expedition, for example, and the myriad ways in which the expedition in 
Frankenstein is implicitly entangled with patriarchal notions of empire. Furthermore, because 
Justine and Elizabeth’s violent deaths are “directly attributable to Victor Frankenstein’s self-
devoted concern for his own suffering. . .and his own reputation” (4), the Creature is made 
exempt from any accountability. 
Because the Creature’s social ostracism is so often paralleled to the feminine experience, 
feminist considerations which attempt to redeem the Creature as a sympathetic figure often do so 
at the expense of recognizing his intentionally problematic function in the text. While the 
Creature is undoubtedly a tragic figure in the novel, Frankenstein’s unflinching depiction of his 
capacity for murderous violence obligates a tension between feelings of mutual pity and horror 
one may feel for him as the plot progresses. In arguing, as Peter Brooks does in Godlike 
Science/Unhallowed Arts: Language and Monstrosity in Frankenstein, that “it must be 
Frankenstein's bride who will be sacrificed to the bride denied to the Monster” because “the 
other represents for each the lack or gap within him” (599), the serial murders committed by the 
Creature are dismissed as the inevitable consequence of some broader equilibrium of loss. The 
notion that the Creature is a passive participant in the crimes committed by his own hands fails to 
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account for Shelley’s careful characterization of the Creature as a profoundly methodical and 
intellectual being. This is, after all, the very character who masterfully pursues Frankenstein to 
the ends of the Earth, effectively frames Justine and Victor for crimes they did not commit, and 
whose very capacity for language and literacy is realized simply through imitation of the De 
Lacey family’s modeled behaviors. The Creature’s intellectual capacity is of critical importance 
precisely because the murders of William, Elizabeth, Justine, and Henry Clerval are framed as 
means to a deliberate and sadistic end. In destroying Frankenstein’s familial system, the Creature 
is conscientiously enacting vengeance for the pain he himself has been made to suffer since birth.  
Regardless of his redemptive qualities, Shelley’s characterization of the Creature as an 
antagonist cannot be dismissed as it most obviously demonstrates the moral corruption borne 
from his expulsion from sympathetic community. Though Tang Soo Ping’s critical interpretation 
of Frankenstein argues that “even [the Creature’s] relentless killing of innocent victims never 
obscures his Edenistic qualities of loving and caring” (257), such a reading directly contradicts 
the Creature’s own profession: “I was benevolent and good; misery made me a fiend” (68). 
Ping’s assertion that the Creature “dies for love” (239) and effectively “brings to Walton the 
promise of redemption” is nowhere supported in the text, as the “depth of sympathy and sorrow 
that [Captain Walton] has not felt before” (239) is neither demonstrated in his actions nor his 
account as the last narrator of the novel. Just as hatefulness informs Frankenstein’s 
characterization of his creation even to his dying breath, Walton, too, is frightened and disturbed 
by the Creature’s visage. Shelley reveals Walton’s immediate impulse at the sight of the Creature 
is not to listen to his tale, but instead to attack him as he believes himself “justified in desiring 
the death of [his] adversary” (146). The volatile nature of this relationship demonstrates that both 
the Creature and Walton are as culpable of intentional cruelty as Frankenstein himself; their 
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actions necessitate antipathy towards the characters they feel justified in harming and this 
antipathy is consistently attributed to the influence of patriarchal institutions.  
Modern interpretations of the novel which exonerate the Creature too readily of his 
crimes consequently perpetuate previous modes of disregarding Frankenstein’s resistance of an 
easy moral divide between its characters. The Creature is no doubt an ostracized and orphaned 
Other, who is “driven from the society and sympathy of [his] fellow creatures” (94), but he is 
nonetheless responsible for at least five major deaths in the novel. If we are to suppose that 
Frankenstein is, as feminist criticism is wont to argue, invested in the moral wrongs of 
patriarchal power structures, this cannot be overlooked. Though the Creature is denied 
humanization and natural rights just as the women in the novel are, he is nevertheless recognized 
and socialized as male throughout the text. Significantly, the violence he enacts is almost 
exclusively directed towards women and those who exist within the margins of a domestic or 
otherwise feminine sphere. While Elizabeth Lavenza and Justine Mortiz undoubtedly remain the 
most obvious examples of patriarchal violence which seemingly lurks in Frankenstein’s every 
corner, even the aborted companion Frankenstein destroys before the Creature’s very eyes is 
female in form and gendered feminine. The annihilation of Frankenstein’s lineage serves as yet 
another manifestation of gendered violence, for even when the Creature’s victims are men, their 
deaths enact the destruction of what is conventionally considered the feminine domain. 
 
III. Romanticism & Moral Sense Philosophy 
 If Frankenstein is indeed, as this study will argue, the site of Shelley’s engagement with 
moral sense philosophy, it is important to detail the model of sympathy demonstrated in the 
novel so that we may best understand its depiction of sympathetic failure. First, sympathy as it 
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occurs in Frankenstein is elevated as the primary means by which a subject may be understood 
in truth by those around them and allowed dignity and rank in larger society. Through the 
relaying of narrative, characters allow each other free access into their interiorities; their secret 
histories, desires, and struggles are at once made bare to the listener and, by consequence, 
identification between individuals is possible via feelings of sympathy. Moral sense philosophy, 
and subsequently Romanticism, believed, as David Hume explains in A Treatise of Human 
Nature, that sympathetic connection between individuals allowed “all affections [to] readily pass 
from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature” 
(576).  In this vein, intimate knowledge of another person renders possible universality between 
individuals and, by consequence, problematizes the socially constructed and systematically 
enforced delineations between oppressors and the oppressed. This facet of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century approaches to sympathy – that is, the perception and potential assimilation of 
societal Others into radically accepting communities – is especially pertinent to Frankenstein’s 
now iconic reliance on the monster archetype, whose status as Other invokes parallels to various 
disenfranchised identities.  
Captain Robert Walton, Victor Frankenstein, and the Creature all rightfully yearn for 
sympathy because they are each destitute, misunderstood, and vulnerable to persecution. The 
acquisition of sympathetic connection is thus rendered the only means by which sense of self, 
companionship, and, by extension, integration into communal order becomes possible. Though 
the three narrators idealize sympathetic union, they each nonetheless fail to achieve it because 
Frankenstein locates both its horror and tragedy in, as Lowry Nelson explains, “the seeming 
impossibility of communicating deep feeling to someone who cares” (167). Sympathetic failure 
is, in fact, so prominent a concern in this novel that Frankenstein’s very structure contributes to 
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its importance, as the interplay between Shelley’s three narrators demonstrates the various ways 
in which individuals are unable to accurately interpret one another’s stories. Holding the 
philosophical ideals of the Romantic Era at a distance, Frankenstein questions the attainability of 
sympathetic community and posits that where sympathy fails, violence and monstrosity abound.  
Mary Shelley’s intellectual formation, from which she perceptively draws considerable 
literary and philosophical influence, reflects Frankenstein’s adherence and subversion of broader 
Romantic and proto-feminist traditions. Evident in her recorded life-long scholarship of 
eighteenth-century texts, Shelley’s understanding of sympathy and social ethics was due at least 
in part to her familial legacy. By the time of her birth, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft 
each achieved notoriety within England’s literary and philosophical circles for their collective 
works. The ideological fingerprints of Anthony-Ashley Cooper, Francis Hutcheson, David 
Hume, and Adam Smith litter their work, embodied in Wollstonecraft’s direct quotations of The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) in Maria or the Wrongs of Woman (1798) and Godwin’s 
repeated allusions to Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) throughout 
his philosophical career. As explained in R.S. White’s Natural Rights and the Birth of 
Romanticism, while all Romantic writers may not have followed “the philosophical niceties of 
social thinkers like Hutcheson and Smith,” their awareness of the pervasive ideological debates 
of their era made itself known regardless, for they “were reflecting them more or less 
consciously in their poems and novels” (49). Frankenstein, it can be said, is thematically, though 
not always explicitly, engaging with the moral philosophy of these thinkers. 
The influence of William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft on Frankenstein’s 
philosophy of sympathy is evident in Shelley’s word choices, literary allusions, and shared 
thematic investment in the plight of women and the socially ostracized. Mary Shelley frequently 
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recorded her studies of Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s works throughout her lifetime but 
appeared especially drawn to their texts in the years directly preceding the completion of her first 
novella. For example, Godwin’s St. Leon (1799) relays the tragedies of a man obsessed with the 
secret arts of alchemy, the same occult science which Shelley’s own Victor Frankenstein relies 
on to animate the dead. Godwin’s later novel, Lives of the Necromancers (1834), catalogues 
eminent figures of science and mysticism throughout history, including the likes of Cornelius 
Agrippa, Albertus Magnus, and Paracelsus whom Frankenstein explicitly invokes in-text when 
he recounts his studies in Ingolstadt. Most obviously, Frankenstein is in itself dedicated to 
“William Godwin, author of Political Justice, Caleb Williams, etc” (4). This allusion to Things as 
They Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794) is especially relevant to Frankenstein for 
it is in this novel specifically that Godwin posits that sympathy is “the magnetic virtue, the 
hidden essence of our life” (286). Reminiscent of the relationship between Frankenstein and his 
creation, Caleb Williams follows the misfortunes of its titular character, “a solitary being, cut off 
from the expectation of sympathy, kindness, and the good-will of mankind” (239) who is 
victimized by an abusive master. Emboldened by the belief that Caleb is “a monster of 
depravity” (169), Master Falkland subsequently abuses his charge, inciting a chain of events 
which lead to Caleb’s unjust persecution, imprisonment, and near insanity. Like Shelley, 
Godwin, too, investigates the limits and shortcomings of sympathy, the insufficiency of 
testimony to effectively convey truth, and the persecution of the vulnerable at the hands of the 
powerful.  
Though criticism has rightfully emphasized Godwin’s influence on Frankenstein to great 
lengths, it is Mary Wollstonecraft’s writings, which Mary Shelley studied with equal enthusiasm 
and care, that contain the sociopolitical and feminist philosophies most relevant to the novel. 
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Author of A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790) and A Vindication of the Rights of Women 
(1792), Wollstonecraft’s literary career was conscientious of women’s oppression and 
concentrated with political intent from its inception. Through the mediums of novel and essay, 
Wollstonecraft spoke in defense of gender equality and, in true Romantic fashion, appealed to 
her reader’s sympathies through imagined, but honest depictions of women’s experiences across 
socioeconomic classes. It is in her final and ultimately unfinished work, Maria or the Wrongs of 
Woman (1798), that Wollstonecraft’s influence on Frankenstein is most apparent. The novella 
examines the unjust imprisonment of its titular protagonist, whose livelihood and sanity are 
threatened when, as Wollstonecraft explains, “the healing balm of sympathy is denied” (134) of 
her. Prison imagery remains a staple amongst Romantic literature – in fact both Caleb Williams 
and Frankenstein similarly depict characters being unjustly imprisoned for crimes they did not 
commit – but Wollstonecraft interpreted imprisonment as an apt metaphor for the totality of the 
feminine experience. Of the female condition within patriarchy, Maria asks: “was not the world a 
vast prison, and women born slaves?” (167). This sentiment is echoed almost verbatim by 
Shelley when the Creature identifies as “vagabond and a slave” (83) because he, like Maria and 
the women she represents, “possessed no money, no friends, no kind of property” (86). Just as 
Frankenstein’s dominance of the Creature and Walton’s mistreatment of his crew depict the 
breadth of abuse socially afforded to the powerful, Maria’s forced institutionalization is only 
possible because her husband, by virtue of being a wealthy man in a patriarchal society, has total 
dominion over her civil rights.  
It is in Wollstonecraft’s aforementioned concern with patriarchal oppression that her 
particular sympathetic socio-political philosophy rests, an intellectual investment which will later 
notably parallel and frame Frankenstein’s own feminist articulations. In consideration of Mary 
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Wollstonecraft’s major writings, Barbara Johnson notes that, for the author, “the injustice of the 
marriage system for women inheres in the fact that men have total control and in the fact that 
women’s feelings are irrelevant” (78). In what is perhaps the most pivotal scene in the text, 
Maria appeals to a judge in defense of another inmate, Henry Darnford. Having shared the full 
breadth of her history, Maria primarily relays the agony she suffered because of her abusive 
husband, but the judge turns a deaf ear. The trial is no doubt designed to reveal the corruption of 
the justice system but, just as importantly, it depicts the insufficiency of narrative to compel an 
unfeeling listener to sympathize and perceive the truth. Wollstonecraft makes clear that the judge 
is specifically intolerant of the supposed “fallacy of letting women plead their feelings” for “if 
women were allowed to plead their feelings, as an excuse or palliation of infidelity” English 
society would be plagued with “a flood-gate for immorality” (354). The judge dismisses Maria’s 
story not because it is beyond the realm of plausibility, but because he specifically refuses to 
disengage with his personally held prejudice against her gender.  
Maria is, like Frankenstein, profoundly invested in the ethical and moral costs of the 
sympathetic failure produced by patriarchy; the absence of sympathetic community facilitates 
Maria’s captivity, bankrupts the efficiency of her testimony before an unfeeling audience, and 
devastates her sense of self. The only character with whom Maria successfully exchanges 
accounts is Jemima whose experiences as a sex worker and a member of the low working class 
have similarly deprived her of “any companions to alleviate [her suffering] by sympathy” (278). 
Just as Frankenstein’s Creature describes himself as a “a monster, a blot upon the earth” (84) and 
“a wild beast” (95), Jemima’s self-identification as “the filching cat, the ravenous dog, the dumb 
brute, who must bear all” (277) excludes her from the realm of human civilization. Jemima 
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laments that the absence of sympathetic company is directly responsible for the degradation of 
her innature human potential:  
I cannot help attributing the greater part of my misery, to the misfortune of having 
been thrown into the world without the grand support of life. . .I had no one to 
love me; or to make me respected, to enable me to acquire respect. . .I was 
despised from my birth, and denied the chance of obtaining a footing for myself 
in society. Yes; I had not even the chance of being considered as a fellow-
creature. . .I was, in fact, born a slave, and chained by infamy to slavery during 
the whole of existence, without having any companions to alleviate it by 
sympathy, or teach me how to rise above it by their example. (278) 
This passage embodies Wollstonecraft’s seminal argument in Maria: Sympathetic community is 
not only integral to emotional wellness, but necessary to the ethical conduct of the broader social 
order. Sympathy is thus the core matter from which subject formation, social belonging, and 
ethical conduct are formed. Societally enforced suffering and personal destruction thus exist in a 
continuum; denying individuals the right to community is thus depicted as detrimental to their 
sense of self.  
In the footsteps of Wollstonecraft’s legacy, Mary Shelley recreates a patriarchal doctrine 
in Frankenstein which favors the masculine over the feminine at every possible level of the 
social order. The world of Frankenstein is founded on a rigid division of gender roles: men 
populate the public spheres of education, expedition, and labor, while women are confined to the 
home without exception. Though raised in the same household, Elizabeth Lavenza is not 
permitted “the same opportunities of enlarging her experience and cultivating her understanding” 
(110) as Victor. Within the domestic realm, the women most associated to the Frankenstein 
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family are provided gender-specific responsibilities: they are wives, caretakers, and nurses. In 
the home, they are at once tended to “as [one] should on a favorite animal” (20) and 
simultaneously victimized by masculine violence, for it is in the marital bed and the servant’s 
quarters that Elizabeth and Justine meet their respective fates. The De Lacey family mentioned 
briefly in the Creature’s narrative may embody this pattern’s only exception, but it is worth 
noting that their idyllic family structure, in which men and women cohabit peacefully, exist 
outside the bounds of British civilization. Impoverished as they are, Felix, Agatha, and Safie 
each execute the duties of labor and the household with seemingly no recognition of a substantial 
social divide between the two. Notably, the De Lacey family is also one in which all members 
are literate and well-learned, as it is from their studies specifically that the Creature acquires a 
capacity for language and sophisticated thought. With this in mind, Agatha and Safie’s status as 
the only women left unscathed by the novel’s conclusion effectively confirms that the women 
most subjected to the Frankenstein family’s patriarchal ideology are consequently the least 
successful in traversing territories dominated by men or surviving their violence. Justine is 
executed for the murder of William, for example, and Elizabeth, though convinced of Justine’s 
innocence, is unable to save her: the testimony she presents the judge and jury is unable to save 
Justine, “on whom the public indignation was turned with renewed violence, charging her with 
the blackest ingratitude” (56). Later, when the Creature vows to seek vengeance against 
Frankenstein on the night of their wedding Elizabeth is left unguarded by Victor and violently 
murdered. It is to this end that any successful study of Frankenstein’s Romantic ideology must 
be considered in tandem with its feminist critique. 
 
Patriarchal Logic and the Failure of Moral Sympathy in Frankenstein 
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Captain Robert Walton’s ill-fated expedition to the North Pole not only begins the frame 
narrative of Frankenstein, but also establishes the preeminent importance of sympathy and the 
impossibility of sympathetic connection within a patriarchal framework of behavior and 
ideology. His pursuit of the Northern Passage, introduced as an appropriately “masculine” value, 
quickly develops into a feverish obsession, which eventually endangers not only himself, but 
also his entire crew – an arc which mirrors the overarching way Victor Frankenstein and society 
at large mistreat and betray the Creature, lead to sympathetic failure, and culminate in disaster. 
Walton’s voyage reflects the interest in exploration that became rampant throughout the 
Enlightenment Era. While the expansion of globalization through the eighteenth century saw 
previously unknown lands explored, mapped, and colonized, the Arctic remained unclaimed. It is 
to this effect that Francis Spufford's study of fictional representations of polar exploration 
declares Walton the prototypical "daring, definitively male experimenter” (59), as men were the 
chief agents by which imperialist projects were most embodied, weaponized, and enacted. To 
this point, Walton’s pursuit of the northwest passage is characterized as a quest for what 
Spufford refers to as a “fantasy [of] a literal polar paradise” (58) where, in Walton’s own 
description, “snow and frost are banished, and sailing over a calm sea, we may be wafted to a 
land surpassing in wonders and beauty every region hitherto undiscovered on the hospitable 
globe” (7). It is worth noting, too, that Walton explicitly believes himself a participant in the 
project of colonization: He imagines his undertaking will work towards “the inestimable benefit 
[of] all mankind” by reconfiguring geographical borderlines and establishing passage to the 
“unexplored regions” (12) of the Earth still untethered to England. For Walton, knowledge of the 
magnetic pole is explicitly coded as an act of conquest on behalf of the British empire. 
 Walton’s inability to recognize the innate human dignity of characters unlike himself 
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exemplifies on a very basic level the sympathetic failure which comes to dominate the novel’s 
structure. Captain Walton’s egocentrism and boundless ambition represents more than just the 
first indication of the novel’s chief concerns with toxic masculinity; it is a behavior set in direct 
contradiction to Shelley’s values of empathy and sympathy. Acting as a primer for the same 
insidious behaviors Victor Frankenstein will later demonstrate in his own narrative, Walton 
represents a single-minded pursuit of “Promethean science, the period’s heady sense that the 
powers of nature might be appropriated for humanity” (59) which is, importantly, gendered. As 
Spufford explains, Frankenstein and Walton both “fail to ground their raptures in an emotional 
intelligence associated throughout the novel with women; in Walton’s case, with his sensible 
sister, whose reservations about his enthusiasm for the polite. . .make up the unheard position 
against which he tries to justify himself” (60). Examination of the text would argue that 
Frankenstein and Walton do more than neglect the virtues that rest outside of the patriarchal 
domain, they explicitly participate in the destruction of it. Just as Victor neglects and ultimately 
eviscerates his familial circle, Walton’s shipmates, who occupy a lower social rank than their 
captain, are killed by the harsh conditions engendered by his leadership.  
To Walton, an undoubtedly unreliable narrator, his standing as a patriarchal figure is 
paramount; he rejects any inkling of sympathy for the characters surrounding him, deflecting the 
dangers fostered by his poor navigation, the polar seas, and the crew’s critique of his mistakes.  
Instead, Walton locates blame in the men who are to him his social inferiors. Whereas he initially 
describes his crew as a unit “possessed of dauntless courage” (10) who share his desire to 
“conquer all fear of danger or death” (7), Walton’s concluding passages at Frankenstein’s end 
characterize the crew as brutish cowards. When Walton’s expedition is effectively halted by the 
sailors, he regards their resistance as a “mutiny caused by despair” (182). However, the crew 
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members are not revolting out of the “cowardice and indecision” (155) Walton unfairly attributes 
to them; a collective study of his letters reveals that the revolt is instead borne from valid 
indignation felt towards Walton’s leadership. The mutiny is a form of self-preservation, for it is 
Walton’s captainship which has by then lead to the deaths of a significant portion of the crew 
scarcely nine months into their expedition.  
Despite his outward clinging to the trappings of patriarchy, Walton’s letters to his sister, 
which serve as the rind of Frankenstein’s cascading narratives, introduce the issue of sympathy 
as a central concern in the novel via his desire for sympathetic community. Walton’s opening 
letter concludes, “Oh, that some encouraging voice would answer me in the affirmative!” (9). 
This deep-seated desire for sympathetic community is further expanded in the next letter, 
wherein Walton confesses: 
I have one want which I have never yet been able to satisfy; and the absence of 
the object of which I now feel as a most severe evil. . .I desire the company of a 
man who could sympathize with me; . . .I bitterly feel the want of a friend. I have 
no one near me, gentle yet courageous, possessed of a cultivated as well as of a 
capacious mind, whose tastes are like my own, to approve or amend my plans. 
How would such a friend repair the faults of your poor brother!” (10)  
The isolation of which Walton complains, however, is one of his own design. For instance, 
Walton believes his lieutenant to be “a man of wonderful courage and enterprise” (11), but 
ultimately decides against fostering any relationship with him on the basis of class, as the 
uneducated man has “has passed all his life on board a vessel, and has scarcely an idea beyond 
the rope and the shroud” (11). By his own admission, Walton sweepingly discounts the sailors as 
potential sympathetic partners because he implicitly does not believe them to be his equals nor 
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“possessed of a cultivated as well as of a capacious mind” (10). Cynthia Pon argues that this 
elitism finds its cornerstone in patriarchy, as “masculine humanity only recognizes its own image 
on the basis of gender, class and race. The female, the socially inferior, and the non-European are 
excluded from the ideal and practice” (36).  The criteria for Walton’s friendship thus necessitates 
a privileged position within an exclusive order of class, wealth, and education to which his 
shipmates have no access.  
Upon discovering Frankenstein on the ice-floes of the Arctic, Walton’s instantaneous 
affection for Victor appears to be rooted in recognition of their mutual investment in a form of 
privileged masculinity.  Having dismissed his shipmates as his social inferiors and thus 
undeserving of his sympathetic consideration, Walton believes he has found a suitable 
companion in Victor: "attractive and amiable" (16), well-educated, and possessive of a nobility 
and elegance found nowhere else. In her seminal book, Between Men: English Literature and 
Male Homosocial Desire, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick describes homosocial relationships as a mode 
of intense but nonsexual bonding between men in which women serve as the conduits through 
which their mutual and forbidden affections are expressed. Broadening the scope of Sedgwick’s 
theory, it can be argued that, in the absence of women, the triangular relationship from which 
Frankenstein and Walton form their bond is built at the expense of other men who, though not on 
the basis of gender, still represent to them their social inferiors on the level of class. Walton 
relies on Frankenstein to dissolve the mutiny, for example, delegating to him a measure of power 
over the crew which would otherwise rightfully belong to the unlearned lieutenant. In exchange 
for the authority Walton gives Frankenstein over his subordinates, Frankenstein offers Walton 
joint dominance over his creation. Frankenstein relays his history to Walton for a singular 
purpose: to secure an oath which signifies Walton’s commitment to Frankenstein’s murderous 
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campaign against the Creature. In the event of his untimely death, Walton is thus instructed to 
“hear [Frankenstein’s Creature] not” but instead “thrust [his] sword into his heart, for [Victor] 
will hover near, and direct the steel aright” (150).  
As Frankenstein’s pattern of failed sympathetic relationships demonstrates, Walton 
understands that sympathy is contingent on identification and that the possibility of sympathetic 
connection rests primarily on narrative exchange. Nonetheless, his attempts at achieving 
sympathetic community are incessantly thwarted by the mistake of addressing himself to an 
unwilling listener. Walton argues that without “intimate sympathy with a fellow man,” he can 
“boast little happiness” (16), suggesting that personhood and emotional fulfillment are 
intrinsically relational by nature. Though Walton seeks a sympathizer “whose eyes would reply 
to [his own]” (10), Frankenstein disallows the mutual emotional access Walton yearns after. He 
concedes that men are “unfashioned creatures. . .half made up” (16) if they do not have suitable 
companions, but if sympathetic community is indeed the “the hidden essence of our life” (286) 
which Godwin understood it to be, Frankenstein resigns himself to the notion that he “cannot 
begin life anew” (15). In discrediting Walton’s ability to “replace those who are gone” (152), 
Frankenstein effectively refuses to answer Walton’s call, preferring isolation to solidarity with a 
lesser man. In voicing his narrative solely to secure Walton’s faithfulness in his vengeful 
campaign, Frankenstein disallows Walton the only opportunity he has granted himself to 
discover an idealized reflection of himself in another.   
 Though Frankenstein’s account reveals the ramifications of antipathy and patriarchal 
relationships, as his abuse of the Creature generates all of the novel’s subsequent horrors, Walton 
learns nothing from his narrative. Upon Frankenstein’s death, Walton’s failure to connect 
profoundly with Frankenstein and effectively achieve sympathetic connection manifests in 
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feelings of instantaneous animosity for the Creature. Despite knowledge of the violent end of the 
Frankenstein lineage and even demonstrated in the scientist’s frame, as Walton observes that 
Frankenstein is physically “emaciated by fatigue and suffering” (14), laying eyes on the 
Creature, Walton is instantly overcome by the “first impulses . . . in destroying [Frankenstein’s] 
enemy” (158). The Creature is consequently granted the opportunity to vocalize his “agony and 
remorse” (158), but his testimony, like Jemima’s before it, fails to sufficiently inspire its 
intended sympathetic effect. Informed by the colonial ideology which has defined his captaincy 
from its inception, Walton deafens his ears to the Creature’s lament at least partly because he 
perceives the Creature as a racial Other. Just as Frankenstein, the prototypical Anglo-Saxon, 
believes the Creature to be undeserving of natural rights and positive regard, Walton does not 
recognize the Creature as a member of humanity but “a being which had the shape of a man” 
(13), a “savage inhabitant of some undiscovered island” (14). Identifying the Creature as 
“monster” (158), “wretch” (159), and “fiend” (159), just as Frankenstein has done in his personal 
narrative, Walton’s violent intent is only momentarily halted by a “mixture of curiosity and 
compassion” (158) at the sound of the Creature’s weeping. The Creature is consequently granted 
the opportunity to relay his suffering, but his testimony is insufficient to inspire significant 
emotional effect. “It is not pity that you feel,” argues Walton, immediately invalidating the 
nature of the Creature’s testimony, but “lament only because the victim of your malignity is 
withdrawn from your power” (159). When Walton’s sight returns to Frankenstein’s form, from 
which the Creature’s physical difference is rendered especially apparent, his “indignation is 
rekindled” (159) against him and the weight of the Creature’s testimony is forgotten once and for 
all.  
Before the formation of the Creature, the ideological blueprint fueling Victor 
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Frankenstein’s misogyny, which informs his subsequent devaluation of women and the socially 
ostracized, is first presented as a masculine rite of passage within the Frankenstein household. 
The opening passage of Frankenstein’s account establishes his familial legacy as a decidedly 
patriarchal one, in which the combined legacy of “ancestors [who] had been for many years 
counsellors and syndics” (18), and his father Alphonse, who “filled several public situations with 
honour and reputation” (18), establish the Frankenstein lineage as “one of the most distinguished 
of that republic” (18). That Shelley, the child of so notable a mother, would forgo any mention of 
a matriarchal presence within the Frankenstein clan is worth noting here; the occupation of the 
public sphere is at once a masculine tradition within Frankenstein’s family and an indication of 
the continued absence of women from their consideration. The first and only matriarch in the 
Frankenstein family appears to be Caroline, who is first introduced as the daughter of Beaufort, a 
merchant and friend of Victor’s father. Though a child, Caroline procures work and “contrives to 
earn a pittance scarcely sufficient to support life” (19) after Beaufort falls ill. Just as we observe 
of the Frankenstein lineage, no mention of Caroline’s mother appears in the text. In effect, 
Caroline functions as both daughter and matriarch of her own household. Caroline exchanges 
one patriarchal authority figure for another. Her father becomes the sole focus of her thoughts, as 
“her time was entirely occupied in attending him,” until she is joined to Alphonse in a marriage 
that is similarly defined by her “gratitude and worship” (19) of him.   
This model of a young woman, originally played by Caroline and replicated a generation 
later in the characters Elizabeth Lavenza and Justine Mortiz, demonstrates a key component of 
the Frankenstein family unit: that it rejects difference by essentially replicating itself, and that it 
sees women, regardless of their roles, as interchangeable. Each woman in the text occupies the 
function of homemaker, pseudo-parent, and wife, playing all roles, yet also simultaneously none. 
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Elizabeth’s relation to the Frankenstein family is notably reconfigured in the 1831 revision of 
Frankenstein, but whether she is Victor’s cousin as she is in the original publication or the child 
of garish villagers adopted by a benevolent Caroline during an Italian vacation, Elizabeth has an 
unchanging purpose as a character—she is adopted into the family so that she may become 
Victor’s “playfellow” (20), his “more than sister” (43), and “future wife” (20). When Caroline 
dies, her dying supplication is directly to Elizabeth who is now expected to “supply [Caroline’s] 
place” for the Frankenstein children in her stead. When Justine Mortiz is similarly accepted into 
the Frankenstein household, Justine “so imitate[s] her phraseology and manners” (67) she 
effectively becomes Caroline’s replica. Furthermore, it is Justine, not Alphonse or Victor, who 
parents William, a maternal function which would rightfully belong to Caroline had she 
survived. Examining the strict function of women in the Frankenstein household, Johanna M. 
Smith writes “the Frankenstein family’s incestuous pattern of reproducing itself by excluding 
difference could hardly be clearer” (321). This exclusion of difference no doubt returns in full 
force as Frankenstein demonstrates the failures of sympathetic connection later in the text, but it 
is significant here that this pattern rests on the baseline assumption that women are effectively 
interchangeable. 
Women in Frankenstein are measured not as individuals in their own right, but reduced 
to the service they perform for the men who surround them. They are, in effect, functions before 
they are people. Just as Frankenstein’s parents reduce Elizabeth to the myriad domestic roles she 
could potentially fulfill for their son, Victor dehumanizes her in turn. In his account, Elizabeth’s 
very existence is suspended in perpetual service to the Frankenstein family: “her sympathy was 
ours; her smile, her soft voice, the sweet glance of her celestial eyes, were ever there to bless and 
animate us” (45). He professes the “warmest admiration and affection” (108) for Elizabeth, but 
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repeatedly likens her to the non-human in a manner that is nowhere else seen except in the case 
of the Creature: because “the saintly soul of Elizabeth shone like a shrine-dedicated lamp in our 
peaceful home,” explains Frankenstein, his affection for her akin to what one would devote not 
to a confidante or lover but to a “a favorite animal” (20). In Frankenstein’s own words, Elizabeth 
exists perpetually outside of the public world, a caged bird whose chief function is “to subdue 
[Frankenstein] to a semblance of her own gentleness” (45). This language could not contrast 
more radically against the language which Frankenstein employs to describe Henry Clerval. 
Whereas Elizabeth is Frankenstein’s “reward” (135) and the “consolation for [his] unparalleled 
sufferings” (135), Henry is Victor’s “beloved friend” (111), “fellow pupil” (44), and “favourite 
companion” (45), and he felt “never completely happy when Clerval was absent” (21).  
Frankenstein’s adverse relationship with the feminine is further illustrated in Shelley’s 
characterization of his scientific pursuits as a figurative act of encroachment upon devalued 
feminine spaces. In rationalizing the morbid obsession which led him to reanimate dead matter, 
Frankenstein describes his experiment as the “[pursuit of] nature to her hiding places” (33). Anne 
Mellor explains that Frankenstein’s depiction of masculine “scientific penetration and 
technological exploitation of female nature . . . is only one dimension of a more general cultural 
encoding of the female as passive and possessable, the willing receptacle of male desire” (1). If 
nature is recognized as a feminine force, it is important to recognize that the rewards of its 
exploitation are reaped by men in the greater interest of patriarchal institutions. Walton’s 
expedition is thus paralleled with Frankenstein’s scientific pursuits; just as Walton ventures into 
the North Pole so that he may, as Shelley writes, "tread a land never before imprinted” (7) at the 
behest of the British empire, Frankenstein’s experiment is chiefly motivated by the fantasy that 
“among so many men of genius…[he] alone should be reserved to discover so astonishing a 
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secret" (31). Frankenstein’s aim in the creation of a new species is a strictly masculine endeavor 
from its commencement, as he imagines himself a pioneer within a discipline which precludes 
women participants. Frankenstein’s aim is not only to distinguish himself from other men, who 
function as both his equals and rivals, but to fashion a form of life-bearing that would render 
women unnecessary. "No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely" (33) as his 
own creation, Frankenstein imagines, because he endeavors to serve as his progeny’s only 
parent; in his imaginings, the necessity of a mother is nil.  
It is the male-on-male violence, injustice, and sympathetic failure depicted in the novel 
that situates Frankenstein’s disregard of femininity and the overarching ramifications of 
patriarchal doctrine as central concerns. In Frankenstein, as in the works of Mary Wollstonecraft, 
patriarchy is as insidious as it is omnipresent, making itself manifest within every dimension of 
the narrative and fueling every act of physical and emotional violence depicted therein. In what 
is perhaps the most direct homage to Maria: or the Wrongs of Woman, Frankenstein’s narrative 
account exhibits a brief shift in setting which crucially presents a Swiss courthouse as a site of 
ethical injustice. By the thirteenth chapter in which these events unfold, Frankenstein has already 
successfully animated his progeny from the dead, disowned him, and become victim to the 
Creature’s vengeance. Justine is promptly accused of the Creature’s crime, as evidence 
implicating her in William Frankenstein’s murder is forced on her person. When the case is 
brought to trial, Justine is granted the opportunity to plead innocent and thus provides an account 
in which “surprise, horror, and misery were strongly expressed” (55) in an attempt to inspire in 
the jury a profound emotional response to her case. Just as Wollstonecraft’s Maria is her own 
defendant, Justine “collected her powers and spoke in an audible although variable voice” (55) 
before ultimately unfeeling listeners who, unconvinced of her innocence and resentful of her 
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demonstration of feeling, regard her narrative not with sympathy, but “public indignation,” 
“renewed violence,” and “the blackest ingratitude” (56).  
Unlike Maria, where the protagonist is provided a single female sympathetic companion 
in whom she may find solace, Frankenstein further probes the alienation caused by patriarchal 
sympathetic failure by surrounding Justine Mortiz with male characters whose personal 
investments in patriarchal doctrine directly contribute to her torment and execution. Citing an 
alleged “depravity and ingratitude” (52) Justine never demonstrates in the text, Alphonse 
Frankenstein believes Justine guilty of William’s murder without hesitation, rendering Elizabeth 
the only character for whom Justine’s innocence cannot be doubted. Though she endeavors to 
“prove [Justine’s] innocence” through a testimony that will “melt the stony hearts of [Justine’s] 
enemies by [her] tears and prayers” (58), Elizabeth maintains the same social vulnerability as 
Justine by virtue of their shared womanhood, which consequently renders her testimony 
illegitimate before the court. Though Alphonse and Victor command more authority and remain 
better capable of halting Justine’s persecution, neither man chooses to do so. While the judge and 
jury fail to perceive the truth in Justine’s testimony and thus condemn her for a crime she did not 
commit, Frankenstein perceives her suffering only insofar as he can devalue its depth and 
relevance. Confronted by her anguished testimony, he remains convinced that his pain surpasses 
that of Justine’s: “The poor victim, who on the morrow was to pass the dreary boundary between 
life and death, felt not as I did, such deep and bitter agony” (108). Frankenstein further posits 
that “the tortures of the accused did not equal mine; she was sustained by innocence, but the 
fangs of remorse tore my bosom, and would not forgo their hold” (62). Significantly, 
Frankenstein’s rationalization for his dismissal of Justine’s testimony directly contradicts 
Justine’s confession: “threatened and menaced, I almost began to think that I was the monster 
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that he said I was. . . . I had none to support me; all looked on me as a wretch doomed to 
ignominy and perdition” (58). The text makes clear Justine’s emotional devastation. The 
suffering she experiences in the face of injustice and antipathy obliterates her sense of self. The 
consequence of her unremitting alienation is not only made manifest in her execution, but also in 
the preemptive torture of her problematic self-image, a sense that she is non-human, wicked, and 
thus deserving of the destruction she soon suffers. 
Victor’s interactions with Justine demonstrate his failure as a sympathetic listener, taken 
to an extreme; he is egoistic, antipathetic toward others, and dismissive toward women. That 
Victor is only invested in Justine’s suffering insofar as he can appropriate ownership of it is 
evident in his failure to intervene in her execution. Though he identifies his involvement in the 
death of his younger brother, recognizing himself “not in deed, but in effect, the true murderer,” 
(59), his self-obsession steadies any impulse to act upon that knowledge. Because disclosing the 
true identity of William’s killer would implicate him and sully his reputation, he refuses to 
exonerate Justine for a crime she did not commit. In effect, Frankenstein values his legacy above 
Justine’s life. Furthermore, he acknowledges this pain so that it may further justify his continued 
campaign to murder the Creature and “extinguish that life which [he] had so thoughtlessly 
bestowed” (62). Notably, Shelley here demonstrates a shift in Frankenstein’s internal logic: 
Victor cites his responsibility in William’s murder as the basis by which he can dismiss earnestly 
sympathizing with Justine’s plight, but refuses the full connotations of culpability. Victor instead 
absolves himself of responsibility within a matter of passages, explaining “when I reflected on 
his crimes and malice, my hatred and revenge [for the Creature] burst all bounds of moderation” 
(62). No longer willing to acknowledge his pivotal role in Justine’s execution, Frankenstein 
instead commits himself to “wreck the utmost extent of abhorrence on his head and avenge the 
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deaths of William and Justine” (62), presenting himself as the vindicator of the very crimes he 
acknowledged his participation in.  
The murder of Elizabeth Lavenza following the abortive destruction of the female 
creature who functions as her narrative foil serves to highlight the relationship whereby gendered 
violence often follows sympathetic failure within patriarchal culture. After the deaths of William 
and Justine, the novel undergoes a brief shift in narrators once the Creature confronts Victor with 
a singular plea. He requests that Frankenstein provide a companion with whom he can “live in 
the interchange of those sympathies necessary for [his] being” (101). It is through his formative 
experiences as a spectator of the De Lacey family that the Creature develops both a sense of self 
and a sympathetic philosophy cohesive to Shelley’s own. The Creature’s account of his rejection 
from the "chain of existence and events” (104) of sympathetic community suggests the failure of 
those around him to properly recognize his “benevolent and good” (68) nature. Their subsequent 
inability to regard him with sympathy, dignity, and an awareness of his natural rights as a 
member of their relational tribe fosters a “misery [that] made [The Creature] a fiend” (68).  
The Creature’s solicitation for a being like himself is problematized by the baseline 
presumption that she will function as his mate; despite eliciting the sympathy of his own creator, 
the Creature lacks an intrinsic sympathetic capacity for the companion he desires. Nowhere in 
the text does the Creature anticipate that his female counterpart would fail to meet his desires or 
that her intentions would deviate from his own. In fact, the Creature’s request parallels the 
Frankenstein family’s own domestic presumptions at the novel’s start. Just as Elizabeth was 
adopted with the explicit design that she would marry Victor, the Creature’s request necessitates 
not only the female creature’s existence, but her obedience, companionship, and affection, too: “I 
demand a creature of another sex, but as hideous as myself . . .we shall be monsters, cut off from 
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all the world; but on that account, we shall be more attached to one another" (102). Believing her 
to be the Eve to his status as Frankenstein’s Adam, the Creature’s presumptions towards his 
anticipated companion demonstrate the Creature’s gendered socialization. Just as Frankenstein 
and the De Lacey family have taught the Creature literacy, speech, and social intelligence, they 
have also clearly modeled a gender ideology which he has completely absorbed. Insofar as these 
characters have internalized and participated in patriarchal culture, they have taught the Creature 
a social doctrine which asserts men’s control over women, who are believed to solely exist, in 
some form or another, to their benefit.  
Patriarchal thought inspires both the near-creation and subsequent dismemberment of the 
female creature in the novel; a sequence that seems to encapsulate virtually all other instances of 
violence, oppression, and domination of the novel’s feminine figures. As Frankenstein gathers 
the materials necessary to construct the female creature, his anxieties regarding feminine 
autonomy and sexuality are at the forefront of his account: 
I was now about to form another being, of whose dispositions I was alike 
ignorant; she might become ten thousand times more malignant than her mate, 
and delight, for its own sake, in murder and wretchedness. He had sworn to quit 
the neighborhood of man, and hide himself in deserts; but she had not; and she, 
who in all probability was to become a thinking and reasoning animal, might 
refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation. . . . She also might 
turn with disgust from him to the superior beauty of man; she might quit him, and 
he be again alone, exasperated by the fresh provocation of being deserted by one 
of his own species. (118-119) 
42 
 
 
Demonstrating reluctance nowhere else exhibited in the novel, Frankenstein questions whether or 
not he possesses “the right . . . to inflict this curse upon everlasting generations” (118), having 
evidently surmised the female creature’s malignant nature. Frankenstein’s compassion for the 
Creature is utterly eradicated by the mere sight of the female body before him and, more 
significantly, all the terrifying possibilities her gender invokes. The Creature’s narrative 
demonstrated his innate potential for altruism and harmony, but Frankenstein nonetheless 
imagines, without evidence, that the feminine creation might be “ten thousand times” (118) more 
malicious than her counterpart. Though she has not so much as drawn breath, Frankenstein 
believes her capable of unparalleled evil surpassing that of his first progeny. He fears she will 
unleash “a race of devils [that] would be propagated upon the earth, who might make the very 
existence of the species of man a condition precarious and full of terror” (119). He even believes 
her capable of a sexual trespass which is never once supposed of the male creature, despite the 
Creature’s repeated acknowledgement of Caroline, Agatha, and Justine’s beauty: that she may 
choose a human male as her sexual partner and thereby cross the natural boundaries which 
separate the living and undead.  
Frankenstein’s decision to abort the female creation is rooted in a rejection of the 
feminine and in a belief that womanhood must be monitored and controlled at all times. His 
horror is directly traced to a deeply held revulsion at the prospect of feminine sexuality that 
cannot be controlled by him, the masculine Creature, or any human male. Mellor explains that 
the female creature “defies that sexist aesthetic that insists that women be small, delicate, 
modest, passive, and sexually pleasing—but available only to their lawful husbands” (7). This is 
no doubt confirmed by the knowledge that it is the female creature’s visage, not her actions, that 
inspire Frankenstein’s antipathy and consternation. Asserting his patriarchal control over all the 
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potential sexual transgressions the female creature signifies, Frankenstein describes the 
mutilation of her body as one would the destruction of an object: “trembling with passion, [I] 
tore to pieces the thing on which I was engaged” (119). As he reflects on the subsequent carnage, 
Frankenstein reasserts this dehumanizing stance by confessing he “almost felt as if [he] had 
mangled the living flesh of a human being” (120). When Victor imagined the limitless gratitude 
of his first creation, he likened the male progeny to a child; when Victor considers the mangled 
form of the female creature, she is never recognized as a person. Though he regards neither of 
his creations with a substantially affirmative sympathetic gaze, the female creature is especially 
victimized by the lethal combination of her creator’s patriarchal ideology and antipathy: 
Frankenstein has by this point in the novel hesitated to destroy the Creature on several occasions 
and has even experienced a single moment of fleeting pity for him, but the female creature is 
provided no such compassion. Frankenstein’s unfounded beliefs regarding her wretched nature 
and subsequent unworthiness as a human being guarantees she is denied sympathetic regard so 
thoroughly that she is dehumanized, demonized, and denied the natural right of life before she 
has ever drawn breath.  
The ease with which Frankenstein justifies the dismemberment of the female creature and 
the Creature’s subsequent victimization of Elizabeth as a vendetta against his creator are 
indicative of the broader patriarchal devaluation of feminine lives. In Frankenstein and the 
Feminine Subversion of the Novel, Devon Hodges explains, “like the monster, woman in a 
patriarchal society is defined as an absence, an enigma, mystery, or crime, or she is allowed to be 
a presence only so that she can be defined as a lack, a mutilated body that must be repressed to 
enable men to join the symbolic order and maintain their mastery” (162). Having witnessed 
Frankenstein’s mutilation of his anticipated companion, the Creature releases a “howl of devilish 
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despair and revenge” (119) and swears to “be with [Frankenstein] on his wedding night” (121). 
To this effect, Elizabeth’s murder on the night of her marriage to Victor is loaded with added 
significance: Frankenstein’s inability to perceive the obvious intent of the Creature’s threat 
reveals his considerations are exclusively tethered to the masculine. In assuming himself to be 
the Creature’s intended target, Frankenstein recognizes Elizabeth as nothing more than a 
spectator of his imagined death: "When I thought of my beloved Elizabeth. . .when she should 
find her lover so barbarously snatched from her– tears, the first I had shed for many months, 
streamed from my eyes” (121). Later, the discovery of Elizabeth’s death is articulated by 
Frankenstein first and foremost through his own physiology before any mention is made of her 
mangled corpse: “my arms dropped, the motion of every muscle and fibre was suspended; I 
could feel the blood trickling in my veins, and tingling in the extremities of my limbs” (121). In 
effect, Elizabeth’s murder is entwined with myriad manifestations of patriarchal ideology: 
Frankenstein’s repulsion of feminine sexuality, the Creature’s refusal to recognize women as 
individuals in their own right, untethered to the wickedness of the men around them, and their 
shared devaluation of women’s lives. As this murderous quid pro quo suggests, within both 
Frankenstein and the Creature’s respective points of view, Elizabeth and the female creature are 
effectively interchangeable. Their deaths serve as the vehicles by which Frankenstein and the 
creature may best one another, their lives effectively reduced to little more than collateral 
damage of an ongoing conflict. 
The Creature physically enforces the patriarchal violence which Frankenstein only 
commits symbolically. He is borne from the appropriation of a natural world characterized as 
intrinsically feminine, his very existence threatens the necessity of the womb, and his murders 
make manifest the patriarchal fantasy to control, punish, and destroy women’s lives, their 
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sexuality, and their autonomy. Though the violence visited upon Justine, Elizabeth, and the 
female creature most obviously demonstrate Frankenstein’s concerns with gender, antipathy, and 
violence, the deaths of the novel’s male characters are also riddled with feminine connotations. 
Immediately after the Creature vows a vendetta against all who embody “the human form” (98),  
he encounters William Frankenstein who immediately perpetuates the hateful cycle enacted by 
Walton and Victor before him. Having spared the Creature little more than a single glance, 
William immediately berates him as a “monster,” “ugly wretch,” and “ogre” (100) and evokes 
Alphonse Frankenstein as a patriarchal authority who will subordinate the Creature: “My papa is 
a syndic—he is M. Frankenstein—he will punish you. You dare not keep me” (100). The 
subsequent murder of the only child in the Frankenstein household represents the first act of 
eradication against the family’s domestic realm, as William’s death subsequently prompts 
Justine’s execution and nullifies Caroline’s dying wish that her child be kept from harm. 
Overcome with grief after Elizabeth’s murder, Alphonse’s subsequent death signifies the end of 
the only other surviving patriarch in the Frankenstein lineage besides the protagonist. The 
creature’s actions effectively eradicate the Frankenstein bloodline and decimate masculine 
characters who are each associated with the traditionally feminine and domestic sphere: children 
and elders.  
Throughout Shelley’s characterization of the toxic relationship of creation, sympathy, and 
destruction between Victor and the Creature, a caveat in Frankenstein’s feminist concerns 
appears: that sympathetic failure, even between men, is not only born from patriarchal ideology 
but also weaponized by it. To this point, it is worth observing the pattern exhibited in the 
language which Victor and the Creature employ throughout the text: their dueling narration 
contains numerous allusions to masculine bonds which are notably defined by an imbalance of 
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power. Frankenstein’s self-identification as patriarch, for instance, necessitates the identification 
of the Creature as his social inferior and so produces an expectation of obedience. For example, 
Frankenstein briefly identifies as the “father” (33) to the prospective “child” (33) that will be 
borne from his experiment. However, his complete unwillingness to express towards the 
Creature the same “bonds of devoted affection” (41) and “silken cord of guidance” (42) 
Frankenstein received from his own parents exposes the true nature of this assertion; 
Frankenstein does not claim fatherhood because he genuinely intends to parent his creation; on 
the contrary, Victor abandons the Creature moments after its ‘birth,’ at the precise moment in 
which he behaves most infantile: defenseless and totally unaware, arms outstretched as he 
stumbles towards Victor, babbling “some inarticulate sounds” (36). Instead, fatherhood is a 
matter of patriarchal status, a means by which Frankenstein’s ego can “claim the gratitude of his 
child so completely" (33), lord over his offspring, and later justify his intended murder of the 
Creature because he is the one who “bestowed” (62) him with life.  
Once the narrative frame shifts to the Creature’s perspective, his repeated deferment to 
the very principles which Frankenstein and Walton previously invoked to disavow him reveals 
the Creature’s own indoctrination into the patriarchal ideology that is a feature of English 
subjectivity. Though the Creature’s identification of Frankenstein degrades from “father” (33) 
and “creator” (69) to “tyrant and tormentor” (121), each of these relationship models are 
definitively masculine and burdened with an imbalance of power which only emphasizes the 
Creature’s vulnerability within the chain of patriarchal authority. That the Creature’s defers to 
patriarchal models of relational power is evident in his pivotal supplication to Frankenstein: 
I am thy creature, and I will be even mild and docile to my natural lord and king if 
thou wilt also perform thy part, which thou owest me. Oh, Frankenstein, be not 
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equitable to every other and trample upon me alone, to whom thy justice, and 
even thy clemency and affection, is most due. Remember that I am thy creature; I 
ought to be thy Adam, but I am rather the fallen angel, whom thou drivest from 
joy for no misdeed. (68)  
The Creature’s plea rests on an interior logic which imagines the bonds between sovereign and 
subject as benevolent in nature, whereby one’s actions, sentiments, and sympathetic reception 
are perpetually informed by what is rightfully owed from one man to the other. This request is 
intertwined, too, with an understanding that sympathetic connection is contingent on effective 
narrative exchange, as the Creature begins his entreaty by requesting, "let your compassion be 
moved. . .Listen to my tale . . . hear me" (66-67). Sympathetic connection on behalf of the 
empowered towards the suffering, then, is imagined by the Creature not as an act of charity, but 
as an ethical obligation of the patriarchal position Frankenstein occupies. That this supplication 
not only fails, but also counterintuitively confirms Frankenstein’s authority and subsequent 
liberty to further reject and destroy the Creature only exposes the injustice inherent to the 
patriarchal social contracts both characters invoke.  
Frankenstein, however, is too consumed by those patriarchal ideas to allow his hatred 
toward the Creature to be checked; believing himself to be the Creature’s social superior, he 
rejects any idea of responsibility or sympathetic obligation. In response to the Creature’s 
petition, Frankenstein regards him with increasingly dehumanizing language: identifying the 
Creature not as a Miltonian Adam but instead a “vile insect” (67), “abhorred monster” (68), 
“fiend” (68), and “wretched devil” (68) within a single passage. This language is not merely 
injurious, it is also designed with the express purpose to exclude the Creature from any sense of 
community, identification, or likeness with his speaker. Because the designation of the character 
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as ‘monster’ is a direct rejection of the character’s self-identification as “thy Creature” (68), 
Frankenstein at once demonizes his creation and effectively disowns him once more, rejecting 
any implication of ethical obligation towards him. Reflecting the Creature’s understanding that 
narrative exchange is the means by which sympathy may be fostered between them, Frankenstein 
further declares, “I will not hear you. There can be no community between you and me” (68).  
Compounding on the examples previously demonstrated by Shelley’s Justine and 
Wollstonecraft’s Jemima, the Creature’s denial of sympathetic regard and subsequent expulsion 
from compassionate community debases his self-image and begets further suffering. Having 
reflected on his expulsion from the Frankenstein household, the De Lacey family, and broader 
English society, the Creature returns to the language and logic of patriarchal bonds: 
I heard of the division of property, of immense wealth and squalid poverty; of 
rank, descent, and noble blood. The words induced me to turn towards myself. I 
learned that the possessions most esteemed by your fellow-creatures were high 
and unsullied descent united with riches. A man might be respected with only one 
of these acquisitions, but without either he was considered . . .a vagabond and 
slave. Of my creation and creator I was absolutely ignorant, but I knew that I 
possessed no money, no friends, no kind of property. I was, besides, endued with 
a figure hideously deformed and loathsome; . . . When I looked around I saw and 
heard of none like me. Was I, then, a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which 
all men fled and whom all men disowned? (83) 
This scene illustrates the Creature’s anguish and, perhaps more significantly, demonstrates his 
internal reconfiguration of the patriarchal power structures he invoked throughout his previous 
sympathetic petition to Frankenstein. Identifying now as a ‘monster’ and ‘slave,’ the Creature 
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understands that his proverbial master will not meet him with benevolence and sympathy 
because, in the Creature’s own words, “all men hate the wretched” (67) and he now assumes a 
complete failure of moral sympathy towards those of his station. If Frankenstein is indeed his 
patriarchal superior, then he has, by his own disclosure, no impulse, obligation, or “power to 
consider whether [he is] just to [the Creature], or not" (69). Though he has undoubtedly felt the 
brunt consequences of his inferior position within these relationship models, the Creature fails to 
renounce the toxic cycle of masculine bonds he has been made victim to. Subverting the 
delineated roles of oppressor and victim between Frankenstein and himself, the Creature only 
perpetuates patriarchal models of relational power by newly resolving to usurp Frankenstein’s 
role as sovereign and embody these positions himself. Confronting him after the destruction of 
the female creature, the Creature rails against Frankenstein, exclaiming: “Slave, I before 
reasoned with you, but you have proved yourself unworthy of my condescension. Remember that 
I have power. . . . You are my creator, but I am your master; — obey!" (120). Forever denied 
sympathy, the Creature ultimately devotes himself to becoming the demon so many believed him 
to be; whereas Frankenstein’s promise to create a companion for the Creature was ultimately 
proven fickle, he executes precisely what he threatens to Victor when he tells him, "you believe 
yourself miserable, but I can make you so wretched that the light of day will be hateful to you" 
(120). He murders all of Frankenstein’s living relations, terrorizes him to such a degree that 
Frankenstein’s sanity is effectively destroyed, has him unjustly imprisoned for Clerval’s murder, 
and ultimately pursues him to the point of death. 
With its protagonists unable to throw off the chains of patriarchal society and reach a 
greater ideal of sympathetic connection, the novel’s final passages are thereafter concentrated 
with the dissolution of legacies, campaigns, and lifelines which permeate every level of 
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Frankenstein’s framing structure. Upon Victor’s death, the Frankenstein lineage, once illustrious 
and rooted in Geneva’s history, is effectively terminated, as no member of the family survives 
the Creature’s vengeful campaign. At the sight of Frankenstein’s corpse, the Creature proclaims, 
"in his murder my crimes are consummated; the miserable series of my being is wound to its 
close" (158). In revealing his intent to commit suicide, the Creature’s anticipated immolation 
would similarly render the “new species” (33) Frankenstein created extinct. As the narration 
returns to Walton, it is revealed that his crew has once more revolted against him, effectively 
forcing the Arctic expedition to an end. The termination of Walton’s polar voyage represents to 
him the end of his “hopes of utility and glory” (155), but further signifies Shelley’s overarching 
belief about social progress. Insofar as the Arctic world represents an unexplored utopian 
landscape, Frankenstein posits that those who are unable to reject the insidious institutions of the 
nineteenth century cannot be ushered into the promised land.  
 
Conclusion 
For Mary Shelley, as for her philosophical influences, sympathy is not only an ethical 
responsibility, but a relational necessity: it is an act of social recognition by which individuals 
concede the connatural human dignity of those unlike themselves. Insofar as Frankenstein is the 
formal embodiment of Shelley’s contribution to moral sense philosophy, the novel does not 
simply affirm sympathy’s importance, it dramatizes the intrinsic challenges of fostering 
sympathetic connection. Because Frankenstein’s characters forfeit their ability to interpret one 
another effectively, lest they surrender their patriarchal power, Shelley posits that narrative 
exchange is not enough to elicit interpersonal connection and, on a broader level, societal 
change. Against such gargantuan institutions, which rationalize the oppression of women and 
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cripple the relational modes men are allowed to foster with one another, individual narrative is 
simply too weak and patriarchal ideology too deafening.  
The conglomeration of Frankenstein’s framing narratives, wherein Robert Walton, Victor 
Frankenstein, and the Creature each devote their last words in the text to expressions of isolation 
and anguish, further demonstrates how even the most ardent attempts to secure sympathetic 
connection are challenged by insurmountable hurdles. Walton voices his desire for a partner who 
might “sympathize with and love [him]”; Victor clings to his isolation and rejects him, asking 
“when you speak of new ties and fresh affections, think you that any can replace those who are 
gone?” (152). Walton mourns Victor’s death, professing, “I have lost my friend” (155), and the 
Creature frames his suicidal ideation with the simple acknowledgement: “I am alone” (160). 
Within the novel’s closing passages, each narrator acknowledges their failure in securing 
sympathetic companionship but remains ultimately unwilling to acknowledge the actions and 
ideologies which sabotaged every sympathetic opportunity they encountered. Just as Hume 
wrote,“[t]he sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov’d from us, and require the 
relation of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely” (318), Frankenstein 
contests sympathy’s contingency upon similarity to self by presenting this prerequisite as a 
guarantee of sympathetic failure. In excluding the feminine, the socially inferior, and the Non-
European from their communal ideal, each narrator neither earns the sympathetic regard they so 
covet nor remedies the abrasive solitude which cultivated their monstrosity; the expeditions, 
histories, and legacies embodied by each of these characters are consequently drawn to a 
premature and dissatisfying close.  
In its conviction that sympathy enkindles ethical behavior, Frankenstein responds to the 
philosophical context provided by Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and the Enlightenment thinkers 
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through its exploration of the ideological hurdles which so often thwart sympathetic 
opportunities. In recognizing Frankenstein’s influences as well as its participation within the 
Romantic tradition, this essay has proven the primacy of sympathy, the fatal ramifications of its 
absence, and the manner in which sympathetic pursuit informs the novel’s characters, conflicts, 
and concluding tragedy. Frankenstein’s representation of the virtues and limitations of 
sympathy, most notably though patriarchy’s detrimental capacity to rupture and forbid 
interpersonal connection, demonstrates the complexity of sympathetic engagement and affirms 
Shelley’s belief that a greater capacity for sympathetic regard is impossible without the 
disavowal of oppressive power structures. Without this ideological renunciation, Frankenstein’s 
narrators remain bound to a patriarchal hierarchy which fails to recognize the individual 
personhood of its participants and instead restricts them to a binary function of either “master” or 
“slave” (120), omnipotent “creator” (229) and prelapsarian “Adam,” or Satanic “fallen angel” 
(68). Though Thomas Hobbes characterized the relationship between a sovereign authority and 
their perceived inferior as a social contract scaffolded upon interpersonal obligation, Shelley 
resists the imagined “mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience” (491) by 
characterizing Frankenstein’s patriarchal relationships as categorically abusive, detrimental to 
social order, and ethically unjustifiable. This is where Frankenstein’s investment in the plight of 
women, gendered violence, and the ostracization of the socially vulnerable lays the groundwork 
for sympathetic failure. Though Walton, Frankenstein, and the Creature uniformly desire to be 
received into sympathetic community, their refusal to renounce their measure of patriarchal 
power renders this self-extension impossible; though philosophers such as Hobbes and Burke 
imagined such relationships as instrumental to the social health of broader civilization, the power 
unevenly allotted to the privileged few within Frankenstein’s patriarchal relationships is 
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characterized as corrupt without exception, inspiring the exploitation and dehumanization of the 
vulnerable by the powerful. Frankenstein, Walton, and the Creature’s barring from sympathetic 
communion not only exacerbates the unrelenting isolation which concentrates their personal 
accounts, but also ignites unparalleled violence upon Frankenstein’s female characters, the 
annihilation of the Frankenstein family, the deaths of countless innocents, and the destruction of 
the domestic sphere.  
Frankenstein’s thematic investment in sympathetic failure and patriarchal violence, as 
delineated in this essay, demonstrates that the inability to identify with those unlike ourselves not 
only has detrimental consequences for the marginalized, but mutually corrupts and destroys the 
individuals who oppress them. This failure, Shelley warns, results in the marginalization and 
persecution of the most vulnerable, potentially creating monsters out of those who were once 
teeming with noble and humane possibility. The difficulty in designating any unilateral guilt in 
Frankenstein, in spite of the myriad crimes and cruelty committed by each narrator, suggests 
sympathy is neither easily achieved nor unequivocally acquired; instead, sympathetic connection 
is a static force in an uninhabitable climate, fleetingly felt before it—like Frankenstein’s 
Creature—is “borne away by the waves, and lost in the darkness and distance” (161). 
Frankenstein’s conclusion, which halts Walton and Frankenstein’s scientific enterprises, claims 
the lives of almost every character in the text, anticipates the extinction of the Creature’s species, 
and confirms that sympathy for Shelley is not only an emotional and ethical necessity, but the 
very lifeblood of social progress. 
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